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I. Introduction  
 
1. Recognizing the legal authority of the Appellate Body to accept and consider an 
unsolicited amicus curiae submission,1 I respectfully submit this brief through 
the Appellate Body Secretariat. 
 
2. The gist of this dispute is whether the Chinese customs office should impose an 
import duty of 25 percent on certain auto parts having the essential character of 
motor vehicles while it levies only 10 percent on ordinary auto parts which do not 
retain such character. Generally, WTO members hold the “right” to interpret 
Harmonized System (HS) and this is why different members may have different 
interpretations in the same tariff classification issues, which was the case in this 
dispute.2 However, the panel ignored this right of importing countries and 
instead equated the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement with 
predictability and expectation exclusively for exporting countries, as it relates to 
“the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade.”3 This is a flawed 
interpretation which severely undermines the balance of rights and obligations 
among WTO members and thus should be corrected by the Appellate Body. 
 
II. The Panel erred in applying the National Treatment discipline 
(GATT Article III:2) in a dispute involving custom duties (GATT 
Article II:1).  
                                                 
1 Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras. 39, 42; Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, ¶¶ 
157, 160. 
2 The panel acknowledged this point. China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 
the Report of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, circulated on July 18, 2008, 
¶ 7.538 [hereinafter the Panel Report]. 
3 Id., ¶ 7.460. 
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3. What is before the Appellate Body is a typical “classification” dispute under 
Article II. It is worthy of noting that all import duties may be indeed 
“discriminatory” in the sense that they establish tariff barriers against otherwise 
free flow of foreign imports. However, to the extent that WTO members impose 
tariffs under their schedules those tariffs should be protected in the WTO system 
and thus are not subject to Article III. Negotiation, not adjudication, should 
reduce the level of these tariffs.  
 
4. Even if these two Articles (Article II and III) arguendo rival each other in their 
application in this dispute, the panel should have elected to apply Article II. It is a 
well established interpretive principle of public international law that a tribunal 
must respect policy discretion of sovereign countries in times of doubt. The 
Appellate Body has also recognized this principle of in dubio mitius.4 In this 
dispute, applying Article II definitely better suits the preserving of China’s fiscal 
autonomy.  
 
5. Concomitantly, the panel’s “conditional” approach which led the panel to 
conclude that China violated both Articles II and III was flawed. It is simply 
illogical to conceive that the same measure could fall within the rubric of a border 
measure and at the same time of an internal measure. This type of reasoning, 
albeit conditional, is prone to severe unpredictability of the WTO jurisprudence, 
                                                 
4 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), ¶165, n. 154, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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in particular from a remedial perspective. The panel violated Article 3.2 of 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) since its approach neither “provid[ed] 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system” nor “clarif[ied] the 
existing provisions of those agreements.” As the panel in Korea - Various 
Measures on Beef did,5 the panel in this dispute should have addressed Article II 
first and then declined to review the Article III claim exercising the judicial 
economy. 
 
6. In its refusal to apply Article II in this dispute, the panel ran afoul of the 
interpretative principle under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Article II:1 (b) reads: 
The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any 
contracting party, which are the products of territories of other contracting 
parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the 
Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set 
forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess 
of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be 
exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of 
this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed 
thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. 
(italics added) 
 
7. The panel held that: 
[W]e consider that, taken together, the terms "on their [products] 
importation" and "into the territory" in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) 
suggest that "ordinary customs duties" are charges which the obligation to 
pay accrues based on the products as they enter the customs territory of 
another Member.  In particular, the strict temporal element of the word 
"on", which points to the precise moment of the action it modifies, 
                                                 
5 Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, the Report of Panel, ¶780, 
WS/DS169/R (July 31, 2000). 
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indicates that an "ordinary customs duty" must be assessed on the basis of 
a good at the moment of importation. (italics added) 
 
8. This is an unduly narrow reading of Article II:1 (B). The panel predicated its 
whole logic on a mechanical interpretation which employed only a couple of 
phrases under the Article in an exclusive manner. According to the panel, an 
ordinary custom duty must be always imposed precisely at the very moment of 
importation. However, it is an inorganic interpretation which totally ignores 
other important phrases modifying this temporal element, such as “subject to the 
terms, conditions or qualifications.” The correct reading is that ordinary customs 
duties, which are usually imposed at the time of importation, may be imposed at 
a later stage. Interpreting the Article in this way, the Chinese customs office may 
impose on foreign auto parts an import duty of 25% after the Verification Center 
completes its assessment as to whether these parts meet the criteria of essential 
character as motor vehicles.6 In other words, such criteria represent the “terms, 
conditions or qualifications” under the Article and thus modify the temporal 
requirement in collecting tariffs (“on their importation into the territory”).  
 
9. Likewise, the panel’s constricted reading which disassociates the phrase of “in 
connection from the importation” from ordinary custom duties is overly artificial. 
Such reading ignores the main message of Article II, which prohibits WTO 
members from imposing any customs duties exceeding their tariff schedules 
regardless of characterization (“ordinary” or “other”) of such duties or their 
temporal dimension as long as they are import-related.  
                                                 
6 The Panel Report, ¶¶ 7.67-7.69. 
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10. The panel also failed to take into account the “General Rules of 
Interpretation” (GIR) under the Harmonized System as well as decisions of the 
HS Committee of the World Customs Organization (WCO) as a critical “context” 
as to Article II:1(b). The Appellate Body in EC – Chicken Cuts viewed that: 
The Harmonized System is not, formally, part of the WTO Agreement, as it 
has not been incorporated, in whole or in part, into that Agreement.  
Nevertheless, the concept of "context", under Article 31, is not limited to 
the treaty text—namely, the WTO Agreement—but may also extend to "any 
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty", within the meaning of 
Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention, and to "any instrument which 
was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty", within the meaning of Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention.  
Moreover, should the criteria in Article 31(3)(c) be fulfilled, the 
Harmonized System may qualify as a "relevant rule[] of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties". 
 
11. GIR 2(a) provides:  
Any reference in a heading to an article shall be taken to include a 
reference to that article incomplete or unfinished, provided that, as 
presented, the incomplete or unfinished article has the essential character 
of the complete or finished article.  It shall also be taken to include a 
reference to that article complete or finished (or falling to be classified as 
complete or finished by virtue of this rule), presented unassembled or 
disassembled. (emphasis added) 
 
12. GIR 2(a) tends to inform the Chinese measures in question. Imported auto 
parts are “incomplete or unfinished” articles which may have the “essential 
character” of complete or finished ones and thus be subject to a tariff rate (25%) 
corresponding to complete or finished ones (motor vehicles). Again, the panel 
narrowly interpreted GIR 2(a), in particular the phrase of “as presented,” and 
concluded that it “denotes a temporal meaning, i.e. the moment when a good is 
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presented to the customs authority.”7 According to the panel’s reading, China 
may not predicate its measures on GIR 2(a) since these measures apply to auto 
parts imported through “multiple shipments” and therefore cannot satisfy the “as 
presented” requirement. 
 
13. However, as the panel itself noted, the “determination whether multiplicity of 
origin shall affect applicability of GIR 2(a) is a matter left to each Contracting 
Party.”8 More precisely, the HS Committee decided that “the classification of 
goods assembled from elements originating in or arriving from different 
countries are matters to be settled by each country in accordance with its own 
national regulations.” Therefore, it is obvious that the China enjoys wide 
discretion in classifying auto parts having the essential character of motor 
vehicles as motor vehicles. The opposite conclusion reached by the panel is an 
unacceptable second-guessing which ignores the context of GATT Article II:1(b) 
and thus runs afoul of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
14. Finally, in its consideration of the “object and purpose” of the WTO 
Agreement, the panel disproportionately accentuated the complainants 
(exporting countries)’ concerns through GATT Article III:2 and therefore 
undermined the defendant (importing country)’s expectation embedded in 
Article II:1(b). The panel held that: 
[T]he "security and predictability of the reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs 
                                                 
7 Id., ¶ 7.412 
8 Id, ¶ 7.432 
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and other barriers to trade ", which is a recognized object and purpose of 
the WTO Agreement, would be undermined if a charge were to be 
considered as an ordinary customs duty even when the obligation to pay 
the charge accrues after goods have already entered into the customs 
territory of China and been assembled into complete goods of the 
corresponding kind. We therefore share the systemic concerns expressed 
by the complainants that if the assembly of the products after their 
importation into the customs territory of a Member could provide a basis 
for tariff classification, the tariff classification system would undermine 
the national treatment obligation under Article III of the GATT 1994, 
which is one of the core principles of the WTO Agreements.  Such an 
interpretation would blur the fundamental distinction between measures 
falling within the scope of Article III:2 and those falling within the scope of 
Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994.9 
 
15. This biased understanding of the WTO’s object and purpose has no place in 
the WTO’s jurisprudence. The Appellate Body in the EC – Computer Equipment 
ruled that: 
[W]e disagree with the Panel that the maintenance of the security and 
predictability of tariff concessions allows the interpretation of a concession 
in the light of the "legitimate expectations" of exporting Members, i.e., 
their subjective views as to what the agreement reached during tariff 
negotiations was. The security and predictability of tariff concessions 
would be seriously undermined if the concessions in Members' Schedules 
were to be interpreted on the basis of the subjective views of certain 
exporting Members alone.10 
 
16. In sum, the panel’s interpretation of GATT Article II:1 was inconsistent with 
Article 31:1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties because the panel 
misread the text of Article II:1, disregarded its critical context (the GIR 2(a) and 
the HS Committee’s decision), and misconstrued the object and purpose of the 
WTO Agreement. 
 
                                                 
9 Id., ¶ 7.211 
10 European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, 
WT/DS62/AB/R; WT/DS67/AB/R; WT/DS68/AB/R, the Appellate Body Report, ¶ 82 (June 5, 
1998). 
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III. In its conditional interpretation of Article II:1, the panel wrongly 
disregarded importing countries’ discretion in the tariff classification 
under the “multiple shipment” situation.  
 
17. As discussed above, the gist of the Chinese measures in question is China’s 
treatment of certain auto parts as motor vehicles for the purpose of tariff 
classification if the former have the essential character of the latter under China’s 
internal criteria. The existence of GIR 2(a) as an important context to GATT 
Article II:1 tends to justify these measures.  
 
18. However, the panel refused to accept this position by narrowly interpreting 
GIR 2(a) in a way which unduly ignored an importing country’s discretion in 
tariff classification. According to the panel, the language “as presented” in GIR 
2(a) presupposes only the “single shipments” scenario in the importation of auto 
parts and therefore precludes the “multiple shipments” scenarios on which the 
Chinese measures are based.11 
 
19. As the panel noted itself, the HS Committee’s decisions function as critical 
guidance in interpreting both GATT Article II:1 and WTO members’ tariff 
schedules, as was confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Compute Equipment 
and EC – Chicken Cuts.12  The HS Committee had concluded earlier that each 
importing country should determine whether it would treat split consignments as 
a single entity in interpreting “as presented” under GIR 2(a).13 In particular, the 
HS Committee decided in 1995 that “the questions of split consignments and the 
                                                 
11 Panel Report, ¶ 7.523. 
12 Id., ¶ 7.423. 
13 Id., ¶¶ 7.408-409. 
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classification of goods assembled from elements originating in or arriving from 
different countries are matters to be settled by each country in accordance with 
its own national regulations.”14 
 
20. The same discretion of the importing countries is secured in constructing the 
“essential character” requirement in GIR 2(a). As the panel acknowledged, the 
WCO Secretariat has noted that “the Nomenclature and Explanatory Notes are 
largely silent regarding the meaning of the "essential character" of the complete 
or finished article as it appears in GIR 2(a)” and that “the Committee has not 
formally developed principles, nor has the Committee ruled formally on the 
classification of unassembled sets of parts for motor vehicles of Chapter 87.”15 In 
other words, “absent specific guidance from the nomenclature (i.e. legal 
provisions) or the Committee (i.e. interpretation of the nomenclature), it is 
within the purview of national customs administrations to interpret provisions 
such as GIR 2(a).”16  
 
21. The HS Committee’s recognition of importing countries’ wide discretion in 
the matter of tariff classification undoubtedly supports an interpretation of “as 
presented” in a way which accommodates the aforementioned “multiple 
shipments” scenario or “the classification of goods assembled from elements 
originating in or arriving from different countries.”17 Therefore, certain 
incomplete or unfinished auto parts having the “essential character” of motor 
                                                 
14 Id., ¶ 7.425; HSC/16/Nov.95, DOC.39.600. 
15 Panel Report, ¶ 7.529. 
16 Id., ¶ 7.531. 
17 Id., ¶ 7.397. 
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vehicles may be classified as motor vehicles at the discretion of importing 
countries in a way consistent with GATT Article II:1.  
 
22. It is truly unfathomable that the panel defied such unequivocal interpretive 
guidance. The panel viewed that treating unassembled parts (such as auto parts) 
as assembled articles (such as motor vehicles) under GIR 2(a) must be limited to 
“technological” reasons such as difficulties in packaging and handling.18 
According to the panel, GIR 2(a) does not address the measures in question since 
the tariff classification under the measures represents “industrial,” not merely 
technological, consideration.19 However, the panel’s view is groundless for the 
following reasons.  
 
23. First, surprisingly the panel based its whole logic for the above-mentioned 
position on a four-decades-old document under the Customs Cooperation 
Council (CCC), which was the WCO’s predecessor. According to the legislative 
history of GIR 2(a) noted by the CCC Secretariat in 1963, the tariff nomenclature 
was originally designed for technological classification of different articles.20 Yet 
this is merely a “historical background” of draft interpretive rules, as the WCO 
Secretariat reaffirmed in its letter to the panel dated on July 30, 2007. The WCO 
Secretariat emphasized that the text of the Explanatory Note (V) to GIR 2(a), 
which reflects the CCC Secretariat’s historical observation, is “merely an 
explanation of historical reasons for articles being shipped unassembled or 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶ 7.439 
19 Id. 
20 Id., ¶ 7.439; Customs Co-operation Council, Nomenclature Committee, 10th Session, Brussels, 
February 26, 1963, Document No. 10.195E. 
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disassembled.”21 While it is true such historical background may provide certain 
guidance in the panel’s interpretation of the current text of GIR 2(a), it is still a 
type of “supplemental” interpretive means as “preparatory work” of the text of 
GIR 2(a) under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It can 
by no means surpass more direct interpretive means such as the HS Committee’s 
decision in 1995 as a “subsequent practice” under Article 31:3 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
 
24. Second, even if we accept arguendo the historical explanation highlighting a 
technological dimension of the tariff nomenclature as the sole interpretive 
guidance for GIR 2(a), it does not necessarily preclude other non-technological 
considerations of importing countries. As the panel itself acknowledged, the 
Explanatory Note (V) to GIR 2(a) provides that “when the goods are presented 
unassembled or disassembled, it is usually for reasons such as “requirements or 
convenience of packing, handling or transport.””22 This means that importing 
countries may accommodate non-technological reasons such as the imposing of 
different custom duties under certain circumstances, as was in this dispute. 
Moreover, even if Paragraph 10 of the HS Committee decision in 1995 does not 
refer to the multiple shipment situation in this dispute as the panel observed,23 
the same Paragraph never actually bars the multiple shipment scenarios either. 
In fact, the panel explicitly recognized this very point. The panel viewed that: 
The WCO Secretariat states that it is inclined to regard the reference in 
paragraph 10 to "the classification of goods assembled from elements 
                                                 
21 Panel Report, ¶ 7.441, n. 747 (emphasis added). 
22 Panel Report, ¶ 7.441 
23 Id. 
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originating in or arriving from multiple countries" rather as reflecting the 
HS Committee's view that the determination whether "multiplicity of 
origin" shall affect the applicability of GIR 2(a) is a matter left to each 
Contracting Party and that the HS does not address the applicability of 
GIR 2(a) to the classification of goods of mixed origin.24 
 
If the WTO members had truly desired to bar any non-technological 
considerations in the matter of tariff classification, they would have stipulated 
explicitly, as was the case in the area of the rules of origin.25 
 
25. Third, the very distinction between “technological” considerations and non-
technical (“economic”) considerations in the tariff classification is not always 
clear cut. All tariff nomenclature issues may be economic in the sense that they 
are all to impose custom duties after all. As the panel itself observed, 
“classification of a good into the proper tariff heading is an essential first step for 
assessing the appropriate tariff duty on the product.”26 Simply speaking, the 
panel must leave to importing countries the question of whether these non-
technological considerations should be included in the tariff classification. It is 
not for the panel to decide.  
 
26. In sum, the panel erred in that it misinterpreted GIR 2(a) in a way which 
would unduly undermine importing countries’ discretion as to their tariff 
classification under the multiple shipment situation as in this dispute. 
                                                 
24 Id., ¶ 7.442. 
25 "Until the work programme for the harmonization of rules of origin set out in Part IV is 
completed, Members shall ensure that: […] (b) notwithstanding the measure or instrument of 
commercial policy to which they are linked, their rules of origin are not used as instruments to 
pursue trade objectives directly or indirectly[.]" (emphasis added) 
26 Panel Report, ¶ 7.449. 
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IV. Conclusion  
 
27. For the abovementioned reasons, the panel’s interpretation breached general 
and supplemental rules of interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is hardly “an objective assessment of the 
matter before it” and thus the panel failed to discharge its functions under Article 
11 of the DSU. In doing so, the panel undermined the delicate balance of rights and 
obligations among WTO members. The Appellate Body should correct such flaw 
and restore the WTO jurisprudence in this matter.  
 
